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The question of State and municipal regulation of transporta-
tion charges naturally leads to two distinct lines of investigation
-the one legal, the other social and economic, the former a
question of right and power, the latter of the wisdom of the exer-
cise of rightful power. In any attempt to investigate the legal
side of this question, it is first essential to consider the status of
the transportation service. In this country the business of trans-
portation has not been assumed by the States, but remains in the
hands of corporations or natural persons who conduct their busi-
ness by means of their own private property. Any attempt
therefore, to regulate transportation charges involves, in some
degree, an interference with the exercise of the full rights of
private property. From this source arises the question upon what
principles and under what circumstances may the State interfere
with the right of private property, either in the way of appropri-
ating it to public uses or of regulating its use by individuals or-
corporations.
The State undoubtedly has the right to take so much of each
person's property for the purpose of public revenue as it may
deem necessary, subject only to the condition that such taking
shall be equitable. Also, wherever it may be necessary, the
State may take private property for public uses, and for public
uses only, provided that this is accomplished by due process of
law and just compensation is made.'
Again, under the police power, the State has wide and indefinite
control of the use. which the citizens may make of their own
property, basing its action upon the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum
non iedas.2 Under the exercise of this power, the State may make
that which has previously been invested with the attributes of
1 Kent's Com. Lect. XXXIV. Story, Const. §§ 1955-6.
2 Kent!s Com. Lect. XXXIV.; also Cooley, Principles of Const. Law, p.
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property to be no property, when this is necessary for the public
health, the public morals, or the public peace and order, or it
may prevent certain modes of enjoyment of property.3 But the
exercise of this power does not involve a taking of private prop-
erty in contemplation of law, however great may be the loss
inflicted. The loss is geierally not direct, but incidental. It is
damnum absgue injuria. Here, therefore, no compensation is
necessary, but there must be due process of law.
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But, in the consideration of our present subject, those forms
of industry which are carried on under legal grant, either actual
or presumptive, are the most important. In these instances there
is no question of the completeness of the power of the State to
regulate the facilities offered to the public, or the charges for ser-
vices performed, by imposing conditions precedent upon the
grantees. 5 Not until the State has bound itself by entering into
contract relations is there any hindrance to the exercise of this
power; and even this limitation upon the part of the State may
be avoided by a provision in the State constitution, or in the act
under which these privileges are conferred, to the effect that the
State reserves the right to alter, amend, or repeal all charters
which may be granted by it.6 Thus far we have considered the
powers of the legislature in the light of the rules of the common
law; but the rules of the common law are themselves of no force
whatever as against positive statutes. The institution of private
property itself might be abolished by an act of the legislature, if
it were not for the limitations upon their power contained in the.
constitutions of the several States and of the United States.
7
Section 8, Article I., of the United States' Constitution confers
upon Congress the sole power of regulating interstate commerce.
The provision of the Fifth Amendment, that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law and that pri-
vate property shall not be taken for public use without just com-
pensation, is held to be a limitation upon the powers of the
national government alone. 8  But a similar clause has been
3 Cooley, Principles of Const. Law, p. 328.
4 Cooley, Principles of Const. Law, p. 324, and cases there cited; also Kent's
Com. Lect. XXXIV.; Story, Const. 9 i954; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.
5 Budd v. New York. 143 U. S. and Munn, etc., supra: Cooley, Principles
of Const. Law, pp. 244 el seq.
8 Cooley, Principles of Const. Law, pp. 313 et seq.; also Dartmouth Col. v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 519.
7 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.
8 Chicago, Mil. & St. Paul. R'w'y Co. v. Minn., 134 U. S. 418; Cooley,
sulbra, p. 327.
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adopted in most of the State constitutions. The only absolute
limitations of the power of the States in this respect are contained
in Section io of Article I. of the Constitution and in Section 1, of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus the States may not impair
the obligation of their contracts, nor deprive any person of his
property without due process of law, nor deny to any person
within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 9
In the case of Budd v. New York, Mr. Justice Brewer in an
able dissenting opinion would make the only grounds for regula-
tion of transportation facilities or charges, the necessary exercise
of the police power of the State, or the granting of special privi-
leges, either actually or presumptively, as in the case of corpora-
tions or where individuals perform a public service or devote their
property to a public use. But the majority opinion of the Court
confirms the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois, and says: "When there-
fore one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use
and must submit to be controlled by the public, for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.'U0 The
United States Supreme Court has, therefore, taken a really
advanced socialistic position, and, as a ground for the regulation
of industry and commerce, has placed public interest in its use on
the same basis as a public use of property." In the Sinking
Fund cases, 99 U. S., Mr. Justice Bradley says when a business
becomes a practical monopoly, so as to be able to exact tribute
from the people, it is subject to regulation by the legislature,
holding such to be the principle of Munn v. Illinois. But in the
case of Chicago, etc. Railway Company v. Minn., 134 U. S. 418,
the court quotes approvingly from Stone v. Farmer's Loan and
Trust Co., 16 U. S. 307: "This power to regulate is not a
power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confisca-
tion."
These powers, according to the opinion in Munn v. Illinois,
may be exercised over private carriers as well as over public car-
riers, provided only the public interest in their business be suf-
ficiently great. The people in their constitution, or the legislature
by statute, may decide that what has hitherto been regarded as
private business, is invested with a public character. And this
decision is fully supported by Budd v. New York. This power of
9 Munn v. Illinois, sufira.
10 Cases cited, sufra.
11 See dissenting opinion by Brewer, J. in Budd v. N. Y.
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regulation may be exercised directly by the legislature, or indi-
rectly by means of a board of commissioners.12 It is suggested,
although not positively asserted, that the legislature itself cannot,
in its regulation, go to the extent of taking private property with-
out allowing recourse to the courts.13 But it is certain that the
legislature cannot empower commissioners to fix rates finally,
without opportunity for a judicial hearing on the question of their
reasonableness. 14
Municipal corporations, in their governmental capacities, are
not only subject to all the limitations of State legislatures, but they
are themselves mere agents of the State government. Their right
to regulate transportation charges must, therefore, be a delegated
right, and this right can be no wider than the terms of their char-
ters will permit.'5
The facts which are urged as requiring State regulation of
transportation charges are: (i) that the railroads make excessive
profits; (2) that their rates are excessive; (3) that they make
unjust discriminations, either by their classification of freight, or
between different localities, or between individual shippers; (4)
that by their combinations, pools, or trusts they are acquiring
too much power.' 6 As the result of a careful investigation of the
whole question, Prof. Arthur T. Hadley concludes that the first
two charges are practically groundless, and that the third charge
is the only one of serious importance. He shows conclusively
that discrimination by classification of freight is beneficial not only
to the railroads, but also to the public in general; and that local
discrimination is not only inevitable where competition exists at
some points, and not at others, but also generally beneficial.
Individual discrimination is the chief evil to be remedied; but
this cannot be done away with unless combination be allowed.
Of the remedies that have been attempted, the limitation of
dividends and enforced competition have proved unavailing and
anything but satisfactory. The law of competition, which ope-
rates so beneficially in enterprises where the permanent invest-
ments are small as compared with the circulating capital, utterly
12 Cooley, sulra, p. 245 and cases there cited; also Chicago, etc., Railway
Co. v. Minn. I34 U. S.
13 Stone v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., ii6 U. S. 307; but see contra
Munn v. Illinois, sujpra.
14 Cooley (as above) p. 324; also Chicago, etc., Railway Co. v. Minn.,
sura.
15 Cooley (as above), Chap. xvii.
16 See Railroad Transportation by Hadley, lassim, especially chapters vi.
and vii.
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fails in the case of those industries where large permanent invest-
ments for but one narrowly defined purpose are required. The
only alternatives for the railroads are ruin, discrimination, or
combination. Ruin cannot be endured; individual discrimination
is an unmixed evil; combination is the only resource.
To the enforcement of pro-rata laws, there can be no serious
objection, provided only that such laws may be enforced upon all
the rival routes. The effect will then be to level up, rather than
to level down, the rates. Otherwise local discrimination must be
allowed. Prof. Hadley admirably sums up the whole question
when he says: " The system of making rates to develop business
or of ' charging what the traffic will bear,' rightly applied, has
been the means - and we shall find it to be the only possible
means -of securing efficient service and low rates." The most
satisfactory method of regulation has proved to be the establish-
ment of commissions with little or no power to control carriers
directly, but solely for the sake of securing publicity. In Massa-
chusetts and elsewhere such commissions have succeeded in bring-
ing about an improvement of transportation facilities and have
exercised a decisiVe influence on the policy of the railroads with
regard to rates. The chief fact which aids a competent commis-
sion in this work is that the permanent interests of the corporation
and of the public are almost always closely allied. The system of
maximum charges either is so burdensome as to impair the effi-
ciency of the service, or leaves such a wide range for the exercise
of discretion on the part of the managing officials as to amount to
practically no restriction.
After all, the strongest arguments against an active policy of
regulation or state ownership or control of railroads are the social
and political dangers involved. When once you teach a man that
he may rely on state aid, you destroy his chief incentive to
industry. The spirit of dependence thus created destroys those
elements of character which constitute the real strength and
prosperity of the State. The extension of government activity in
the industrial field opens vast opportunities for political corrup-
tion and bribery. Far better is it to rely more on individual
exertion and the operation of natural laws than, on every slight
occasion, to invoke the interposition of government.
